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Abstract 
The traditional “enforcement” paradigm of tax administration views taxpayers as 
potential criminals, and emphasizes the repression of illegal behavior through frequent 
audits and stiff penalties. However, an important trend in tax administration policies in 
recent years is the recognition that this paradigm is incomplete. Instead, a revised 
“service” paradigm recognizes the role of enforcement, but also emphasizes the role of 
tax administration as a facilitator and a provider of services to taxpayer-citizens. This 
research utilizes laboratory experiments to test the effectiveness of such taxpayer 
service programs in enhancing tax compliance. Our basic experimental setting mimics 
the naturally occurring environment: subjects earn income, they must choose whether to 
file a tax return, and they then must choose how much of their net income to report to a 
tax authority that may audit the subject. To investigate the effects of taxpayer services, 
we “complicate” these compliance decisions of subjects, and then provide “services” 
from the “tax administration” that allow subjects to compute more easily their tax 
liabilities. Our results indicate that uncertainty reduces both the filing and the reporting 
compliance of an individual. However, we also find that agency-provided information 
has a positive and significant impact on the tendency of an individual to file a tax return, 
and also on reporting for individuals who choose to file a return. 
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1. Introduction 
In the traditional “enforcement” paradigm often used to analyze tax compliance 
behavior, taxpayers are viewed and treated as potential criminals, and the emphasis is 
on repression of illegal behavior through frequent audits and stiff penalties (Allingham 
and Sandmo, 1972 and Yitzhaki, 1974). More recently, many have come to realize that 
this paradigm is incomplete. An expanded “service” paradigm recognizes the role of 
enforcement, but also emphasizes the role of tax administration as a facilitator and a 
provider of services to taxpayer-citizens.1 Indeed, many recent tax administration 
reforms around the world have embraced this new service paradigm, generally with 
significantly positive effects on citizen perception of the tax administration. 
 
However, while such “kinder, friendlier” provisions may improve the image of the tax 
authority, their actual effect on tax compliance has not, to our knowledge, been 
systematically examined. In this paper, we utilize laboratory experiments to test of the 
effectiveness of taxpayer service programs both in encouraging an individual to file a 
return (“filing” compliance) and in increasing the individual’s subsequent level of 
reported income (“reporting” compliance). Our results indicate that uncertainty reduces 
both the filing and the reporting compliance of an individual. However, we also find that 
agency-provided information has a positive and significant impact on the tendency of an 
individual to file a tax return, and also on reporting for individuals who choose to file a 
return. 
 
The laboratory offers several advantages over empirical investigations based on field 
data, not the least of which is having a true measure of individual reporting behavior. In 
the field it is difficult to measure – and to measure accurately – something that by its 
very nature people want to conceal; in the laboratory we know the exact levels of 
compliance of all participants in the experiment. It is also difficult to control in 
econometric work using field data for the many factors that may affect the compliance 
decision and to identify their separate effects on compliance; in the laboratory we can 
alter policy parameters in an orthogonal fashion, so that we are better able to attribute 
behavioral changes to particular policy changes.3 Particularly relevant here is the 
potential tradeoff between enforcement effort and service provision, as emphasized by 
Alm and Martinez-Vazquez, 2003, McBarnet, 2003, McBarnet, 2004, Kirchler et al., 
2008, Braithwaite, 2003a and Braithwaite, 2009. Measuring and identifying their 
separate effects with field data are quite difficult; however, we are able to do so in the 
laboratory by introducing enforcement and services in separate treatments. Finally, it is 
necessary in compliance work to account for the heterogeneity of individual motivations 
across the taxpaying population and for the possible differential effects of tax agency 
practices that might shift some individuals from one class of behavior (e.g., non-
compliant) to another (e.g., compliant) rather than making all individuals more 
compliant. Picciotto (2007) discusses a taxonomy of behaviors that is particularly 
relevant to our investigation; see also Kirchler et al. (2008). If the rules of compliance 
are ambiguous or subject to interpretation, an individual may intend to comply but may 
still be seen as non-compliant by the tax agency, and a taxpayer who expects to be 
misinterpreted by the agency may well feel justified in being intentionally non-compliant. 
These types of individuals are particularly interesting to examine because they may 
view ambiguity of the rules as a justification for tax evasion and so may respond 
positively to the provision of assistance services. However, identifying these individuals 
with field data is problematic; in contrast, we are able to do so in the laboratory. 
 
Our primary focus is on how an individual’s tax reporting decisions are affected by tax 
agency provision of information (e.g., reporting compliance), in an environment in which 
individuals do not know with certainty their “true” tax liability. Our design allows us to 
study the decision to file as well (e.g., filing compliance), although this is not our primary 
focus. The basic experimental setting mimics the naturally occurring environment. In 
each tax period, subjects earn income, they must choose whether to file a tax return, 
and (conditional upon filing) they must choose how much of their net income to report to 
a tax authority that may audit the return. To investigate the effect of providing taxpayer 
information services, we “complicate” the filing/reporting decisions of subjects though 
multiple entries on the tax form and also through uncertainty regarding the subject’s true 
tax liability. As a treatment variable, we then provide information services from the tax 
administration that allow subjects to compute more easily and accurately their tax 
liabilities. As noted, we find that the uncertainty reduces filing and reporting compliance, 
but that tax agency provision of information on an individual’s tax liability is able to 
reverse – indeed, more than offset – these effects. 
 
In the next section we discuss the theory underlying the individual filing and reporting 
compliance decision. We then present our experimental design, followed by the 
experimental results. We conclude in the final section. 
 
2. Tax compliance as a behavioral phenomenon 
At its most elemental level, the tax compliance decision can be cast in the economics-
of-crime approach pioneered by Becker (1968) and first applied to compliance by 
Allingham and Sandmo, 1972 and Yitzhaki, 1974. Here the taxpayer is seen as facing a 
gamble between two states of the world: in one state the individual reports income (and 
so pays taxes), and in the other state the individual does not report income (and so 
evades taxes). The individual compares the expected utility from reporting (the safe 
option) with the expected utility of evading (the risky option). 
More precisely, suppose an individual receives an income I, and must choose how 
much to report to the tax authorities. Reported income R is taxed at the rate t. 
Unreported income is not taxed; however, the individual may be audited with a fixed and 
known probability p, at which point all unreported income is discovered and a fine f is 
imposed on each dollar of unpaid taxes. The individual’s income IC if caught 
underreporting is 
 
(1)    
 
while if underreporting is not detected, income IN is 
 
(2)    
 
The individual chooses R to maximize the expected utility EU(I) of the evasion gamble, 
or 
 
(3)    
 
where utility U(I) is assumed to be a function only of income and where E is the 
expectation operator. This optimization generates the usual first- and second-order 
conditions, which can be solved to examine the responses of the individual to changes 
in the various parameters. For the interesting case where R < I, it is straightforward to 
show that increasing the probability of an audit and/or the fine rate will lead to higher 
compliance. 
 
This approach is of course a significant oversimplification of the broad activity we call 
“tax evasion”. The actual setting in which individuals make decisions is much more 
complex, and these complexities affect behavior in ways that go far beyond the scope of 
the standard model. 
 
One simplification is that this approach examines only the reporting decision. There is 
also a prior filing decision, or whether or not to even file a tax return. To the extent that 
non-filers are not “in the system” and so are not at risk of being selected for audit, the 
traditional policy response of increased enforcement efforts is not effective. 6 Indeed, 
the traditional Allingham and Sandmo, 1972 and Yitzhaki, 1974 analyses of the 
reporting decision do not fully capture the elements of the individual’s filing decision 
because submitting a tax return with underreported liabilities is inherently different from 
failing to submit a return at all. Evasion while filing and reporting raises the specter of an 
audit since the tax return is “in the system”; a return that has not been filed may be 
exposed to a much lower risk of audit. However, if the individual who has not filed a 
return is detected as having not filed, there may be additional penalties. There is also a 
time and resource cost of filing. The relevant tradeoff facing the individual is therefore a 
lower probability of detection for non-filing (plus a zero time and resource cost from non-
filing) versus a higher penalty for detected non-filing. For this filing decision, the 
individual must compare the expected utility from filing versus the expected utility from 
non-filing, where an individual who files must also then determine the amount of income 
to report on the return. See Erard and Ho (2001) for a detailed analysis of the non-
filing/filing decision. 
 
Another important simplification in the standard theory is that it implicitly assumes that 
the individual knows with certainty the true tax liability. In fact, the computation of an 
individual’s true tax liability is not a simple matter. The tax code is relentlessly complex, 
and the computation of allowable deductions, credits, and the like is frequently open to 
interpretation. Often, reporting that could be interpreted as evasion is simply a 
misunderstanding of the rules on the part of the taxpayer. In these cases, rulings can 
appear to be capricious, and the taxpayer may respond to such perceptions by actually 
reducing initial levels of compliance and waiting for an audit to provide the true 
interpretation. Thus, complexity in the tax regime can lead to lower compliance as the 
individual seeks to gamble more not less, and this effect may be exacerbated if 
taxpayers become frustrated and respond to the complexity by intentionally evading 
(Kirchler et al., 2008 and Picciotto, 2007) In other cases, however, some individuals 
who face uncertainty about tax code interpretations may instead respond by overpaying 
their taxes, a response that is especially likely if the individual exhibits loss aversion. In 
short, the effects of complexity can go in the direction of either increasing or decreasing 
compliance. 
 
One way to incorporate these considerations is to assume that the complexity assigns 
“fuzzy” values to the elements in an individual’s set of reporting decisions (e.g., 
deductions and tax credits). In the simplest setting, this result of complexity can be 
viewed as a mean-preserving spread, and the degree of uncertainty is captured by the 
support of the distribution of the values (Rothschild & Stiglitz, 1970). Risk neutral 
individuals would simply base their reporting decisions on the mean value. However, a 
risk averse individual may anticipate the possibility of overpaying through uncertainty, 
and respond by evading more. Suppose that this same individual is informed through an 
audit that the uncertainty led to a significant penalty. This person may respond by 
evading more in the future reasoning that the ambiguity in the tax liability is the fault of 
the tax administration and that the evasion is justified. This is similar to the sort of 
behavior modeled by “regret theory”, which gives rise to the widespread observation 
that people set a higher value for compensation demanded to part with a good than they 
are willing to pay to acquire the same good. This latter perspective suggests that 
compliance may be enhanced when individuals view their interaction with the tax 
authority in a positive light. In particular, when the services provided by the tax authority 
are viewed as helpful and the responses to questions are provided in a timely and 
accurate fashion, then compliance is likely to be higher than if the interaction is viewed 
as being adversarial. 
 
There are of course other considerations that might enter an individual’s calculus and 
complicate the “gamble” setting. Social psychologists study the compliance effects of 
individual perceptions of the transparency and fairness of tax administration (Kirchler et 
al., 2008). 
 
Taken together, these factors lead us to modify the standard evasion model. Assume 
that an individual who files a tax return incurs both a time and financial cost C of filing a 
return, and a non-pecuniary (or psychic) cost associated with evading one’s own tax 
liability if one is not caught, as captured by the variable γ. Note that the psychic cost 
associated with cheating arises only if one is actually cheating, as assumed and 
analyzed by Gneezy and Rustichini (2000). Thus, a taxpayer who complies fully and is 
not audited experiences no change in utility from the psychic cost of evasion. 
 
Assume also that a filer may deduct some amount D from reported income R before 
paying taxes; alternatively, assume that the individual is allowed a tax credit against 
taxes. The actual level of allowable deductions or credits is both uncertain (given tax 
code complexities) and constrained (given institutions), so that tax liabilities cannot be 
reduced to zero. Further, assume that an individual who does not file a return escapes 
the filing cost C and the non-pecuniary cost γ; however, p′ is the probability (possibly 
equal to zero) that an individual who has not filed a return is apprehended by an audit, 
at which point he or she is forced to pay all unpaid taxes at rate t plus a (higher) penalty 
at rate f′ on all unpaid taxes, where f′ > f. 
Finally, assume that the tax authority may provide “services”. The greater is the service 
level of the tax authority, the lower is the uncertainty associated with allowable 
deductions and the lower is the cost C of completing a tax return. Also, the greater is 
the service level, the higher is the size of the psychic cost γ and the lower is the utility 
return to cheating.  
 
An individual who chooses not to file a tax return (and so who declares no income) 
therefore has expected utility equal to 
 
(4)   
 
An individual who decides to file a tax return and declare income has income defined by 
modified versions of income in the two states of the world. With a tax deduction, income 
IC now becomes 
 
(5)    
 
and income IN in Eq. (2) becomes 
 
(6)    
 
The definition of expected utility from filing (Eq. (3)) is unchanged, and is repeated here 
as Eq. (7), or 
 
(7)    
 
The individual now faces a more complicated calculus. The individual must first choose 
whether or not to file a tax return, by comparing the value of expected utility from non-
filing from Eq. (4), with the expected utility of filing and then reporting the optimal 
amount of income and deductions in Eq. (7), using the modified definitions of IC and IN in 
Eqs. (5) and (6), respectively. If the individual decides to file a return, he or she must 
then choose the optimal amount of reported income and deductions, from the 
maximization in Eqs. (5), (6) and (7). 
 
In the face of these many elements, it is straightforward to demonstrate in this 
framework that (under some conditions) improved tax administration services will 
improve filing and reporting compliance, both by reducing the uncertainty surrounding 
deductions and also by increasing the psychic cost of cheating from the adoption of a 
more helpful interaction between the tax authority and the taxpayer.  The next section 
discusses our experimental design for examining these impacts. 
 
 
 
3. Experimental design and treatments 
Our experimental setting implements the fundamental elements of the voluntary 
reporting system of most country’s individual income tax.14 Participants earn income by 
performing a task, and they self-report tax liability to the tax authority. At the time of 
reporting only the individual knows his or her true level of tax liability, and the subject 
can choose to report any amount from zero on up. An audit occurs with an announced 
probability, contingent on filing a return, and any unreported taxes are discovered. If the 
participant has underreported tax liability, then both the unpaid taxes and a penalty are 
collected. An individual may also choose to not file a return, in which case the audit 
probability is reduced to zero in our setting. This process is repeated over a number of 
rounds each representing a tax period. Participants are informed that they will be paid 
their after-tax earnings at the end of the experiment, converted from lab dollars to US 
dollars at the rate of 80 lab dollars to 1 US dollar, and at the completion of the 
experiment all subjects are paid in private their individual earnings.15 Into this setting, 
we introduce features that “complicate” the compliance decisions of subjects, and we 
then provide “services” from the “tax administration” that allow subjects to compute 
more easily their tax liabilities. 
 
As in the naturally occurring setting, various factors complicate the tax reporting 
decision in our experiments. In addition to reporting earned income, an individual can 
claim an allowed deduction (or a reduction in taxable income) as well as a tax credit (or 
a reduction in tax owed, comparable to the US Earned Income Tax Credit). We set the 
tax deduction at 15% of income, and we introduce either a “Low Income Tax Credit” or a 
more general “Income Tax Credit”; in both cases the credit starts at a given level and 
declines at a stated rate as income increases, and in both cases the receipt of the tax 
credit is conditional upon filing. These credit and deduction amounts are chosen such 
that the participants perceive them to be salient. 
 
These factors by themselves add some complexity to the tax reporting decision. Also, 
the exact levels of the deduction and the credit are, in some settings, uncertain to the 
taxpayer at the time of filing, so that their presence also results in potential tax liability 
uncertainty. Uncertainty about one’s true tax liability and the provision of information 
services that resolves the uncertainty constitute the central treatments in our laboratory 
setting. 
 
We implement the uncertainties on the credit and the deduction via mean-preserving 
spreads (with a uniform distribution) on the deduction and the tax credit. Thus, the 
participants are informed of the means of the allowed deduction and tax credit and the 
ranges for each. 
 
Participants are also informed, with certainty, of the audit probability, the penalty rate, 
and the tax rate. We set the tax rate at 35% for all sessions; the penalty rate is also 
fixed for all sessions at 150% (e.g., the participants must pay unpaid taxes plus a 
penalty of 50% of unpaid taxes if audited). The audit probability is varied once within the 
session, and the participants are told that there is zero probability of audit if no tax form 
is filed; even so, the presence of the tax credit generates an incentive to file a tax return 
because only filers are eligible for the credit. In the information services treatment, 
information is provided that is complete, accurate, and costless to the participant. 
 
Table 1 summarizes the basic experimental design. Treatment T1 provides a baseline 
setting that entails no uncertainty and no tax authority information. The second 
treatment (T2) introduces uncertainty of tax liability. Participants in this treatment face 
uncertainty regarding their allowed deduction and tax credit, where we hold the level of 
this uncertainty constant throughout the treatment. The third treatment (T3) entails the 
same uncertainty as in the second treatment, but introduces the option of resolving the 
uncertainty by receiving information from the tax authority; that is, participants in this 
treatment are able to click on a button to reveal the true levels of the deduction and the 
tax credit. The parameters used for sessions are reported in Table 2. 
 
Our experimental setting is very contextual, in order to provide the necessary degree of 
“parallelism” to the naturally occurring world that is crucial for the applicability of 
experimental results (Plott, 1987 and Smith, 1982). Our experimental interface and 
instructions use tax language throughout, the participants decide whether or not to file a 
tax return, and they disclose tax liability in the same manner as on the typical tax form 
(e.g., entering income, deductions, and credits on a tax form). There is a time limit on 
the filing of income, and the individual is automatically audited if he or she fails to file on 
time. A timer is shown on the screen; when there are 15 s remaining, the timer changes 
color to red, and the clock begins to flash as a reminder that the filing period is about to 
end. 
 
Participants are recruited from the pool of undergraduate students and staff at a US 
public university. Upon arrival at the laboratory each participant is randomly assigned a 
computer located in a cubicle, and is not allowed to communicate with other 
participants. The instructions are conveyed by a series of computer screens that the 
participants read at their own pace. Clarification questions are addressed after the 
participants complete the instructions and participate in three practice rounds. The 
participants are informed that all decisions will be private; the experimenter is unable to 
observe the decisions, and does not know the individual earnings from the income 
earning task. The experimenter does not move about the room once the session starts, 
in order to emphasize that the experimenter is not observing participants’ compliance 
decisions. These features reduce, as much as possible, both peer and experimenter 
effects that could influence participant decisions. Also, the participants are informed via 
the consent sheet that all responses are anonymous, that no individual identification will 
be collected, and that the only record of participation will be the receipt form signed to 
receive payment at the end of the session.  
 
Table 1. Experimental treatments. 
 
 
Table 2. Experimental parameters. 
 
 
Subjects do not sign consent forms to further increase their anonymity. Participants are 
told via the instructions that payments will be made in private at the end of the session 
and that all responses are anonymous. 
 
Taken together, these experimental procedures implement the properties of a double 
blind design. The lack of subject-to-subject interaction alone implements a single blind 
setting. The lack of subject-to-experimenter interaction, the strictly imposed subject 
anonymity through the computer interface (including the audit process), and the private 
payment mechanism to subjects implement a double blind design between the subject 
and experimenter. 
 
Rounds proceed as follows. Participants begin each round by earning income based 
upon their performance in a simple computerized task, in which they are required to sort 
numbers into the correct sequence using the computer mouse. The individual finishing 
the task with the quickest time earns the highest income (100 “lab dollars”); the second 
place finisher earns 90 lab dollars, and so on. Ties in the earnings task are broken 
randomly. Individuals are informed of their earnings and those of the others in their 
group, without being able to identify individuals, in order to ensure that they believe the 
relative nature of the earnings. This represents the only information individuals have of 
others. After earning income, participants are presented with a screen informing them of 
their individual income in that round, as well as the tax policy parameters (i.e., the audit 
rate, the penalty rate, and the tax rate). The deduction reduces reported income; the 
credit directly reduces the amount of the taxes paid. Participants are informed that they 
may enter on the tax form the amounts they choose for their earned income, their 
deduction, and their tax credit. These choices determine the final taxes that they pay.16 
They are also informed that they may be audited, in which case all underreported taxes 
will be discovered and a penalty will be imposed. 
 
In the sessions in which the allowed levels of the deduction and of the tax credit are 
uncertain, the participants are presented with a range from which the true value of the 
deduction and credit will be drawn. When information services are provided, the 
uncertainty range is again shown, but the participants are able to click on a button on 
the screen to have the true levels of deduction and tax credit shown. This information is 
both perfect and costless to the participant. 
 
The tax form is not yet provided at this point. Participants may choose to get a form or 
not, and there may be a cost for the form to simulate the costs of assembling 
information for computing tax liabilities. If the participant chooses not to obtain a tax 
form, then they do not file and they are not subject to an audit in the current round.17 If 
the participant chooses to get the form, the cost, if there is one, is deducted from the 
participant’s income for the round. Even if the participant obtains the form, the 
participant may still choose to not file by selecting the “Not File” button on the tax form 
page. Subjects are informed of all these procedures via the instructions and also via the 
feedback information provided during and at the end of the round. 
 
If participants choose to file, then they must also choose the amount to report to the tax 
authority for each entry on the tax form (e.g., income, deduction, and credit). For each 
set of entries, the computer automatically calculates the resulting tax liability. 
Participants are able to experiment with different reports during the time allowed for 
filing and can observe the potential changes in their reported take home income. Since 
the tax filing season is limited, there is a time limit imposed in the experiment. A timer at 
the bottom of the tax form counts down the remaining time. The filing period is set at 
120 s, and the counter begins to flash when there are 15 s remaining. If time expires 
and no tax form has been filed, then the participant is automatically audited and an 
additional 10% penalty is imposed. The process in the lab mimics that by which a 
taxpayer may well conduct different calculations in the time prior to actually filing her 
taxes (e.g., whether he or she uses one of the available tax software programs or 
simply does the tax return by hand). 
 
Individual audits are determined by the use of a “virtual” bingo cage that appears on 
each participant’s computer screen. A box with 10 balls (blue and white) appears 
following the tax filing. The balls begin to bounce around in the box, and after a  
 
Table 3. Aggregate results by experimental treatment. 
 
 
brief interval a door opens at the top of the box. If a blue ball exits, the individual 
participant is audited; a white ball signifies no audit. The fraction of blue balls 
determines the audit probability.18 The audit applies only to the current period 
declarations, not to previous (or future) periods. The computer automatically deducts 
taxes paid and penalties (if any are owed) from participants’ accounts. When an audit 
occurs, the true values of the uncertain components (the deduction and the tax credit) 
are used, and the participant’s declarations are examined. If the participant has 
underreported the tax liability, then a fine is imposed; however, no refund is made for 
cases where the participant has overpaid the tax liability by claiming deductions below 
the allowed deductions or credits below the true credit. Following the audit process, 
participants see one final screen that summarizes everything that happened during the 
round. 
 
A few additional design elements are worth mentioning. If no information is provided in 
the tax liability uncertainty treatment (T2), then participants learn their true liability only if 
they are audited. If the taxpayer has overpaid taxes for any reason and is audited, any 
excess tax payments are not returned to the taxpayer, as is sometimes the practice of 
the tax authorities.19 The audit probabilities are set at values of 0.3 or 0.4, and all 
participants experience both rates during the session.20 The probability that an 
individual is detected evading taxes is the same for all lines on the tax return, or income, 
credits, and deductions. The fine rates are consistent with penalties imposed by the IRS 
for evasion. To focus on tax compliance decisions (filing and reporting), we do not 
introduce a public good financed by the tax payments, so the tax payments are not 
transferred to the taxpayers in any way. 
 
The dedicated experimental lab consists of 25 networked computers, a server, and 
software designed for this series of experiments. Sessions were conducted at a major 
state university, using both students and staff as participants. Recruiting was conducted 
using the Online Recruiting System for Experimental Economics (ORSEE) developed 
by Greiner (2004). The participant database was built using announcements sent via 
email to all students and staff. Participants were invited to a session via email, and were 
permitted to participate in only one tax experiment, although other experimental projects 
are ongoing at the time and participants may have participated in other types of 
experiments. Only participants recruited specifically for a session were allowed to 
participate, and no participant had prior experience in this experimental setting.21 
Methods adhere to all guidelines concerning the ethical treatment of human subjects. 
Earnings averaged $18 for student subjects. Staff participants received a higher 
exchange rate to reflect their higher outside earnings, and average payoffs for staff 
were $28. 
 
4. Results and analysis 
One hundred and thirty-one individuals participated in the experiment. Table 3 reports 
the aggregate figures for filing behavior and reporting behavior by treatment. The 
aggregate numbers indicate that uncertainty concerning tax liability results in lower 
reporting compliance rates but that providing information that resolves the uncertainty 
increases reporting. With uncertainty, the overall reporting compliance rate is 0.62 (T2), 
which is statistically lower than the 0.67 rate without uncertainty (p = 0.025) (T1). 
Further, reporting compliance significantly increases when information services are 
provided in the uncertain setting (T3): 0.70 versus 0.62 (p = 0.001). In the aggregate 
data, filing behavior does not appear to be affected  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Estimates for tax form filing and reporting compliance behavior. 
 
 
by uncertainty or information services. The probability of filing is not statistically different 
between the certain and uncertain treatments (p = 0.72) or between the uncertain 
treatments with and without information services (p = 0.29). 
 
Note that that the filing rate is approximately 70% across the three treatments despite 
the fact that the audit probability if no return is filed is zero. While this behavior may 
seem anomalous, it is in fact consistent with maximizing behavior on the part of the 
participants. Recall that subjects are allowed to claim a tax credit, but only if they file a 
tax return. Given the presence of the Low Income Tax Credit, roughly 40% of the 
subjects in a given session have an incentive to file because the tax owed is negative 
and the tax credit is refundable; the percentage is higher in the case of the more 
general Income Tax Credit. Further, if any individuals underreport income in the 
presence of either credit, then the effective credit is even higher, and even more 
individuals have an incentive to file. 
 
We turn to a conditional analysis at the individual level to confirm the initial impressions 
from the aggregate data. We estimate the effects of uncertainty and information 
services on filing and reporting while holding other factors constant, using the basic 
specification of 
 
(8)   
 
where the dependent variable Yi,t denotes subject i’s decision either to file a tax form or 
to report income in period t; Incomei,t is subject i’s earned income in period t; Wealthi,t is 
subject i’s accumulated earnings (or Wealth) in period t; AuditProbabilityi,t is the audit 
rate for subject i in period t; TaxLiabilityUncertaintyt is an indicator variable that signifies 
the presence of uncertainty about tax features in period t; TaxAgencyInformationt is an 
indicator variable that signifies the presence of agency-provided in period t; Xi is a 
vector of demographic variables (e.g., subject age, subject sex, subject own preparation 
of tax returns, subject claimed as a dependent on parental tax returns); ψt is a set of 
T − 1 dummies that capture potential non-linear period effects; ui are random effects 
that control for unobservable individual characteristics; εi,t is the contemporaneous 
additive error term; and ψk is the coefficient for variable k. We also include a dummy 
variable for whether the individual is audited in the previous period, and, in the filing 
equation, we include TaxFormCosti,t, or the price subject i must pay to obtain a tax form 
in period t. 
 
For the tax form filing decision, we report the results for a linear probability model, with 
the dependent variable defined as the probability that individual i files a tax form in 
period t (Yi,t equals 1 if the form is filed and 0 otherwise). 22 For the tax reporting 
decision, we report results for a Tobit model with the dependent variable defined as the 
reporting compliance rate of individual i in period t (Yi,t equals reported tax paid divided 
by true tax owed of individual i in period t). 23 In all cases, we employ panel methods to 
control for subject heterogeneity and time period effects. Our estimates are presented in 
Table 4. 
 
The conditional estimates confirm our initial impressions. Estimated coefficients from 
the reporting model indicate that the presence of uncertainty lowers the reporting 
compliance rate (significant at the 0.000 level), but that the provision of information 
service that resolves the uncertainty increases tax reporting to more than offset the 
uncertainty effect (significant at the 0.000 level). Estimates from the tax form filing rate 
model also correspond to the aggregate results. These results indicate that tax filing 
behavior is slightly affected by tax liability uncertainty and that the effect is offset almost 
exactly by the provision of information services (both coefficients significant at the 0.03 
level or better). Thus, it appears that taxpayers underreport their liabilities in the face of 
uncertainty; when this uncertainty is resolved, the taxpayers respond by increasing their 
tax reporting but not by materially increasing their probability of filing. 
 
The remaining coefficients are generally consistent with results reported in the literature 
(Alm, Jackson, & McKee, 1992a). Filing and reporting are higher for women than men, 
and are negatively correlated with both income and wealth. Filing is also negatively 
correlated with the cost of obtaining the tax forms. The audit probability is not a 
significant determinant of filing or reporting in this more complex setting, although the 
range of the audit probabilities used here may not be sufficient for us to generalize the 
results. Those who prepare their own taxes appear to be more prone to file and to be 
more truthful in reporting tax liability. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
How do taxpayers respond to tax agency information that both provides services to the 
taxpayer and also reduces the uncertainty associated with income reporting? Faced 
with uncertainty concerning true tax liability, a taxpayer may respond by reporting more 
or less than the expected tax liability. The taxpayer may also simply choose not to file a 
tax return when faced with uncertain liabilities and the possibility of making an 
overpayment or when faced with a penalty for an underpayment detected via an audit. 
In our simplified laboratory setting, taxpayers earn income and qualify for a deduction 
and a credit. The taxpayers must choose to obtain a tax form, and can opt to file or not. 
A simple audit and penalty process is introduced in which the tax agency discovers the 
true tax liability through the audit. Penalties are imposed for non-compliance whether 
due to information uncertainty or deliberate misreporting. Importantly, we introduce 
uncertainty regarding both an allowed deduction and an allowed tax credit, and, to 
simulate the information services of a “kinder, friendlier” tax agency, we introduce an 
information service available at some monetary cost to the taxpayer. 
 
Our results show that individuals report less tax when their liability is uncertain, but that 
this lower reporting is more than offset when the tax agency provides information at low 
cost to the taxpayer. This suggests that recent IRS policy actions to increase taxpayer 
services may be a useful tool to combat tax evasion. Similarly, we also find that tax 
uncertainty reduces filing but that information provision again offsets the uncertainty 
effect on filing; this latter result is of particular interest because non-filing is difficult to 
detect and punish in the field. Future work will expand this research in several 
directions, including consideration of additional levels of informational uncertainty and 
extra assistance in completing tax forms. 
 
More broadly, our results indicate clearly that strategies to improve compliance must be 
based on more than improved enforcement only. Instead, what is needed is a multi-
faceted policy approach that emphasizes enforcement, but one that also emphasizes 
other administrative policies such as services. Put differently, detection and punishment 
must be present – the “punishment” paradigm – but other tools are needed as well, 
tools that reflect the provision of better services to taxpayers consistent with the 
“service” paradigm. In short, there should be a wide range of policies to reflect the 
equally wide range of motivations that lie behind individuals’ compliance decisions. 
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